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ARGUMENT
Introduction
In its opening Brief, Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. (hereinafter "Agency"), raises three issues of dispute with the judgment
of the trial court in the case below.
1.

Whether

Agency's

These issues are:

certificate

of

self-funded

coverage obtained pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-401 was
secondary to the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy of insurance
covering Jorgina Chambers, the driver of the Agency automobile at
the time of the accident;
2.

Whether Agency should be primarily responsible for

personal injury protection benefits; and
3.

Whether

the

limits of

any

coverage

afforded

by

Agency pursuant to its certificate of self-funded coverage for any
one accident can exceed $40,000.00.
Jorgina Chambers and Farmers Insurance Exchange (hereinafter "Farmers") response to Point I consists principally of an
attempt

to distort Agency's argument on appeal.

Farmers'

assertions, Agency

has never claimed

Contrary to

that

it is not

responsible to make any payments to Morgan Chambers as a result of
the accident.

Rather, Agency's position is that Farmers' policy of

insurance

is

primary

coverage.

Farmers never really addresses this argument.

to

Agency's

certificate

of

self-funded

In its response to Point II, Farmers argues that Agency
has already conceded that it is primary for paying personal injury
benefits.

Agency has never conceded this point.
1

Finally, in response to Point III, Farmers argues that
Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-407, as it existed at the time of the
accident at issue, requires Agency to provide coverage of at least
$80,000.

This argument flies in the face of the clear meaning of

the statute.

Agency addresses each of Farmers' arguments in the

following sections:
POINT I
AGENCY'S CERTIFICATE OF SELF-FUNDED COVERAGE
PROVIDES COVERAGE FOR THIS ACCIDENT. HOWEVER,
THAT COVERAGE IS SECONDARY TO CHAMBERS' POLICY
OF INSURANCE.
Farmers never addresses the central issue of whether a
certificate of self funded coverage is equivalent to insurance.
Instead, Farmers spends a great deal of time attempting to persuade
this Court that Agency is claiming it does not have any obligation
to pay for damages to the injured party under its policy of selffunded coverage and provides the Court with a lengthy argument as
to why this position is not supported by law.

For example, on page

15 of its brief, Farmers states:
Agency makes a distinction between the obligation to indemnify Ms. Chambers for her negligence and its obligation to indemnify third
parties for injuries caused by Chambers to the
same extent an insurer would be. This is a
distinction without a difference since Agency
has refused to participate in the settlement of
the claims of Morgan Chambers.
(Emphasis
added.)
Farmers' statement here is simply not true.

Agency has

never disputed that it is obligated to respond to damages pursuant
to

its policy of

self-funded coverage, nor has it refused to
2

participate in the settlement of any claims asserted by Morgan
Chambers.

Agency's position has always been that it is obligated

to pay damages to Morgan Chambers after Farmers has tendered its
policy limits.
On page 12 of its brief, Farmers argues that Agency is
"required by statute to afford primary coverage on vehicles which
it has elected to self-insure."
this statement.

Farmers cites no authority for

Farmers' position appears to rely on a rather

tortured reading of § 31A-22-309(4).

Farmers claims this section

requires the policy insuring the motor vehicle at the time of the
accident to be primary for all purposes.
As Agency explained in its appellate brief, § 31A-22309(4) is clear on its face that it only applies to personal injury
protection.

It does not speak to the other aspects of automobile

insurance, nor has the Utah Supreme Court ever interpreted it to so
apply.

Therefore,

it has no application to the issue being

considered here.
On page 16 of its brief, Farmers again avoids the central
issue by assuming its conclusion when it says:
Agency's contract with Chambers is not before
the court nor does Agency offer any support for
its claims that in the event this court
determines that Agency's self-funded coverage
is primary, Agency may recover whatever amount
it is required to pay from Jorgina Chambers.
Such a finding on the part of this court,
however, would circumvent the determination
that Agency's self-funded coverage is primary
and render it meaningless.
Agency's ability to subrogate against Jorgina Chambers for any
amounts it pays to third parties injured by her negligence arises
3

from the common law principal that one who is obligated to indemnify

rather

than

indemnitee.

insure

is entitled

to subrogate

against the

Agency cited the case of Home Indemnity Co. v. Humble

Oil & Refining Co., 314 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. 1958), in support of this
proposition.
demonstrate
Chambers'
stance.

Agency's whole purpose in pointing this out is to
why

Agency's

response

policy

of

to this point

insurance

actually

is not primary.

reinforces Agency's

That is, unless the Court rejects decades of common law

permitting subrogation in the indemnity context, it is meaningless,
and

illogical

to

rule

that

Agency's

self-funded

coverage

is

primary.
Farmers also criticizes Agency's citation to Hearty v.
Harris, 574 So.2d 123
issue in this case.

(La. 1991).

Hearty supports the central

The Hearty court pointed out that self-funded

coverage cannot be insurance.

The court's reasoning was that

insurance must be provided by a company that is certified and
regulated by the many laws regulating

the

insurance business.

Because self-funded coverage does not originate with an insurance
carrier, it cannot be considered insurance.
Agency's response to Southern Home Insurance Company v.
Burdette's Leasing Service, Inc., 234 S.E.2d 870 (S.C. 1977), cited
by Farmers in its brief, is that that case is wrongly decided and
is against the weight of authority.
courts

in

other

jurisdictions,

For the reasons identified by

which

decisions

are

cited

in

Agency's brief on appeal, self-insurance does not possess enough
similar qualities to insurance to be considered the equivalent of
4

insurance.

Because Farmers fails to address the central issue of

whether a certificate of self-funded coverage constitutes insurance
as that term is used in the Farmers' policy, Farmers presents no
reason why this Court should not conclude that Agency's certificate
of self-funded coverage is not insurance as that term is used in
the Farmers' policy and therefore, Agency's policy of insurance
should not be primary.
POINT II
AGENCY DISPUTES THAT IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
PRIMARY TO PAY PIP BENEFITS.
In the proceedings below, Agency stipulated it would pay
PIP

benefits.

However, Agency

has

always maintained,

as it

maintains now, that it should not be held to be primary for those
benefits.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth in Agency's brief

on appeal, this Court should hold that Farmers' obligation to pay
PIP benefits is primary.
POINT III
AGENCY'S LIABILITY LIMITS CANNOT EXCEED STATUTORY
MINIMUMS.
Agency has addressed this issue at length in its Appellate Brief.

The clear import of the statute, and its successor, is

that they were intended to ensure the availability of minimum
limits.

Neither statute was intended to increase those limits.

5

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Agency respectfully requests that
this Court overturn the trial court's decision with respect to each
issue on appeal.
Dated this

day of July, 1993.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C,

Robert K^Hi^der
Wesley/W. ^Lang
Attorneys for Defen
Agency Rent-A-Car
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ADDENDUM
The appellant hereby provides copes of the pertinent statues
cited in its reply brief. These are as follows:
Section 31A-22-309 (4)
Section 41-12a-401
Section 41-12a-407

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JUL 2 9 1993
•/•
f

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
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31A-22-309

History: C. 1953, 31A-22-307, enacted by sentence in Subsection (2)(a), added present
U 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 159; Subsection (2)(d) and redesignated former Sub1989, ch. 261, § 13; 1990, ch. 327, § 8; 1991,section (2)(d) as present Subsection (2)(e) and
ch. 74, $ 7.
made minor stylistic changes in Subsection
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- (l)(a) and in the second sentence in Subsection
ment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "main- (2)(a)
taining, and administering" in the next-to-last
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Allowable benefits.
—Loss of earnings.
Allowable benefits.
—Loss of earnings.
A claimant who was unemployed at the time
of his or her accident can collect disability ben-

efits for lost wages from prospective employment only if the claimant establishes that a job
was available for which the claimant was qualified and that the claimant would have taken
that job. The legislature did not intend to provide compensation for "loss of earning capacity" unless a claimant has suffered a direct and
specific monetary loss. Versluis v. Guaranty
Nat'l Cos., 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1992).

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection,
( D A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained
one or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member of the insured and not insured
under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his
injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war,
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive,
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials.
147

31A-22-309

INSURANCE CODE

(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which
may be contained in other types of coverage.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307
are reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because he is on active duty
in the military service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any period are
overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is
received by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is
later supported by reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days
after the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of llk% per
month after the due date. The person entitled to the benefits may bring an
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the
insurer is required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to
the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the other
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages
recoverable; and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160;
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, § 8;
1992, ch. 230, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,1991, made minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote

Subsection (2)(a)(i), which read: "for any injuries sustained by the injured while occupying
another motor vehicle owned by the insured
and not insured under the policy."
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the
beginning of Subsection (1).
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41-12a-401

PART III
OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY
REQUIREMENT
41-12a-301. Requirement of owner's or operator's security
— Exceptions for off-highway vehicles and offhighway implements of husbandry.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Federal government
Even if the federal government could be
characterized as an insurer because it provided
financial security for its employees in regard to
vehicle operation claims, it could not be subjected to mandatory arbitration under

§ 31A-22-309(6), since this would conflict with
the administrative arrangement established in
the Federal Tort Claims Act. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp.
651 (D. Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — State regulation of motor vehicle
rental (<<you-drivew) business, 60 A.L.R.4th
784.

2 issued by the Risk
ificates and registrato the registration of
provided in Section
ies. — The 1991 amend1 29, 1991, added Subsecand made related changes.

41-12a-304. No-fault tort immunity ineffective.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D. Utah
1989).

PART IV
PROOF OF OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY
41-12a-401. Means of providing proof of owner's or operator's security.

of motor vehicle rental
JSS, 60 A.L.R.4th 784.

(1) Whenever proof of owner's or operator's security is required under this
chapter, it may be provided by filing with the department any of the following:
(a) a certificate of insurance under Section 41-12a-402 or 41-12a-403;
(b) a copy of a surety bond under Section 41-12a-405;
(c) a certificate of deposit of money or securities issued by the state
treasurer under Section 41-12a-406; or
(d) a certificate of self-funded coverage under Section 41-12a-407.
(2) Whenever the term ''proof of financial responsibility" is used in this
title, it shall be read as "proof of owner's or operator's security."
319

41-12a-404

MOTOR VEHICLES

History: C. 1953, 41-12a-401, enacted by
L. 1986, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29,1991, made no apparent change in this section.

41-12a-404. Limitation on cancellation of coverage specified in certificate,
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured ob-

tains another policy providing similar coverage, 61 A.L.R.4th 1130.

41-12a-405. Surety bond as proof of owner's or operator's
security.
(1) Proof of owner's or operator's security may be furnished by filing with
the department a copy of a surety bond, certified by the surety, which conforms to Subsection 41-12a-103(9)(b). The bond may not be canceled except
after ten days' written notice to the department.
(2) If a judgment rendered against the principal within the coverage of the
bond is not satisfied within 60 days after judgment becomes final, the judgment creditor may, for his own use and benefit and at his sole expense, bring
an action in the name of the department against the surety executing the
bond.
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-405, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
4M2a-103" for w41-12a-104" in the first sentence of Subsection (1).

w

41-12a-407. Certificate of self-funded coverage as proof of
owner's or operator's security.
(1) The department may, upon the application of any person, issue a certificate of self-funded coverage when it is satisfied that the person has:
(a) more than 24 motor vehicles; and
(b) deposits, in a form approved by the department, securities in an
amount of $200,000 plus $100 for each motor vehicle up to and including
1,000 motor vehicles and $50 for every motor vehicle over 1,000 motor
vehicles.
(2) Persons holding a certificate of self-funded coverage under this chapter
shall pay benefits to persons injured from the self-funded person's operation,
maintenance, and use of motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a policy to
the self-funded person containing the coverages under Section 31A-22-302.
(3) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, the department may, upon reasonable grounds, cancel the certificate.
Failure to pay any judgment up to the limit under Subsection 31A-22-304(2)
within 30 days after the judgment is final is a reasonable ground to cancel the
certificate.
(4) Any government entity with self-funded coverage for governmentowned motor vehicles under Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, meets the requirements of this section.
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41-12a-404

MOTOR VEHICLES

History: C. 1953, 41-12a-401, enacted by
L. 1986, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29,1991, made no apparent change in this section.

41-12a-404. Limitation on cancellation of coverage specified in certificate.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured ob-

tains another policy providing similar coverage, 61 A.L.R.4th 1130.

41-12a-405. Surety bond as proof of owner's or operator's
security.
(1) Proof of owner's or operator's security may be furnished by filing with
the department a copy of a surety bond, certified by the surety, which conforms to Subsection 41-12a-103(9)(b). The bond may not be canceled except
after ten days' written notice to the department.
(2) If a judgment rendered against the principal within the coverage of the
bond is not satisfied within 60 days after judgment becomes final, the judgment creditor may, for his own use and benefit and at his sole expense, bring
an action in the name of the department against t{ie surety executing the
bond.
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-405, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
41-12a-103" for "41-12a-104" in the first sentence of Subsection (1).

w

41-12a-407. Certificate of self-funded coverage as proof of
owner's or operator's security.
(1) The department may, upon the application of any person, issue a certificate of self-funded coverage when it is satisfied that the person has:
(a) more than 24 motor vehicles; and
(b) deposits, in a form approved by the department, securities in an
amount of $200,000 plus $100 for each motor vehicle up to and including
1,000 motor vehicles and $50 for every motor vehicle over 1,000 motor
vehicles.
(2) Persons holding a certificate of self-funded coverage under this chapter
shall pay benefits to persons injured from the self-funded person's operation,
maintenance, and use of motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a policy to
the self-funded person containing the coverages under Section 31A-22-302.
(3) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, the department may, upon reasonable grounds, cancel the certificate.
Failure to pay any judgment up to the limit under Subsection 31A-22-304(2)
within 30 days after the judgment is final is a reasonable ground to cancel the
certificate.
(4) Any government entity with self-funded coverage for governmentowned motor vehicles under Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, meets the requirements of this section.
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MOTOR VEHICLE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
active April 29,1991, made no apparge in this section.

ion of coverage speci-

History: C. 1953, 41-12a-407, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1991, ch. 203, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added the Subsection (2) designation; redesignated former
Subsection (2) as present Subsection (3), added
Subsections (l)(a), (l)(b), and (4); deleted "and
will continue to have the ability to pay judg-

41-12a-412

ments in an amount equal to twice the single
limit amount under Subsection 31A-22-304(2)"
following "has" in Subsection (1); substituted
"chapter" for "subsection" in Subsection (2);
and substituted "In accordance with Chapter
46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act"
for "Upon not less than five days* notice and a
hearing pursuant to notice" in Subsection (3).
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41-12a-412. Proof of owner's or operator's security required to preserve registration.
(1) A motor vehicle may not be registered in the name of any person required to file proof of owner's security unless proof of that security is furnished for the motor vehicle.
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (b), if the department lawfully suspends or
revokes the driver's license of any person upon receiving record of a conviction or a forfeiture of bail from a court of record, the department shall
also suspend the registration for all motor vehicles registered in the name
of the person.
(b) Unless otherwise required by law, the department may not suspend
the person's motor vehicle registration under Subsection (a), if the person
has given or immediately gives and then maintains proof of owner's security for all motor vehicles registered by the person.
(3) Licenses and registrations suspended or revoked under this section may
not be renewed, nor may any driver's license thereafter be issued, nor may
any motor vehicle be thereafter registered in the name of the person until he
gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's security.
(4) If a person is not licensed, but by final order or judgment is convicted of
or forfeits any bail or collateral deposited to secure an appearance for trial for
any offense requiring the suspension or revocation of license, or for operating
an unregistered motor vehicle upon the highways, a license may not thereafter be issued to the person and a motor vehicle may not continue or be registered in his name until he gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's
security.
(5) If the department suspends or revokes a nonresident's operating privilege because of a conviction or forfeiture of bail, the privilege remains suspended or revoked unless the person has given or immediately gives and
thereafter maintains proof of owner's security.
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-412, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48; 1992, ch. 80, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added the subsection designations (2)(a) and (2)(b), added
"Subject to Subsection (b)w at the beginning of
Subsection (2)(a) and inserted "from a court of

record" near the middle of that subsection, substituted all of the present language of Subsection (2)(b) before "if the person" for "The department may not suspend the person's motor
vehicle registration unless otherwise required
by law," and made stylistic changes throughout the section.
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